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Perils of the Reverse Silver Platter Under 
U.S. Border Patrol Operations 
D. Anthony* 
16 U. MASS. L. REV 232 
ABSTRACT 
In the face of expanding U.S. Border Patrol operations across the country, that agency 
often acquires evidence during its searches that is unrelated to immigration or other 
federal crimes but may involve state crimes. States are then faced with the question of 
whether to accept such evidence for state prosecutions when it was lawfully obtained 
by federal agents consistent with federal law but in violation of the state’s own search 
and seizure provisions. Sometimes referred to as “reverse silver platter” evidence, 
states have come to widely varying conclusions as to the admissibility of federally-
obtained evidence that would clearly have been inadmissible had it been obtained by 
state actors. This Article explores the approaches and rationales employed by states on 
this question and the legal implications thereof, particularly in light of sometimes 
constitutionally dubious Border Patrol activities, the “border search exception” to the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the broader significance of states 
choosing to sacrifice their own constitutional principles and rights of their citizens in 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2017, the United States Border Patrol set up a vehicle 
checkpoint in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Ostensibly, the primary 
purpose for the checkpoint was border enforcement, but part of that 
border enforcement process involved drug detection dogs. Aware that 
the federal government had no intention of prosecuting low-level drug 
crimes and that its own charge was border security, Border Patrol 
collaborated with local law enforcement prior to and during the 
checkpoint stops. This collaboration ensured local police were present 
at the checkpoint and could be provided with any drug evidence 
obtained, allowing for state charges to be brought against those who had 
drugs confiscated as a result of the federal searches.1 The problem was 
that Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against 
unreasonable search and seizure, and the use of drug detection dogs 
without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing violated that protection.2 
In the resulting legal challenge brought by the individuals charged with 
drug crimes based on evidence found during the searches, the state 
claimed that state civil liberties do not constrain federal authorities 
acting within its boundaries, no state action was involved in the 
checkpoint, and that state prosecutors were free to use the evidence 
obtained by federal authorities and provided to state law enforcement 
who were present.3 The defendants argued that this amounted to an 
illegal end-run around state law; had the state done what Border Patrol 
did, the evidence obtained would have been clearly inadmissible.4 They 
claimed that acting in concert with federal authorities does not cure that 
illegality, so the evidence should be excluded.5 
This scenario raises the question of how a state court can, and 
should, deal with the admissibility of evidence obtained by a federal 
official consistent with federal law, but in violation of state law. This 
Article will explore the legal implications of a case such as this, 
including the overlap of federal and state authority and the sometimes-
blurred boundaries of each within the context of federalism. It will 
investigate the increasingly expansive activities of Border Patrol, the 
 
1 State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, 2018 WL 2106769, at *1–2 (N.H. 
Super. May 1, 2018). 
2 Id. at *3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIX. 
3 McCarthy, 2018 WL 2106769, at *2. 
4 Id. at *6–7. 
5 Id. at *7. 
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“border search exception” to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, and the conflicts with state civil liberties provisions when 
the exception leads to evidence in state prosecutions generally 
impermissible under state law. The analysis of appropriate boundaries 
and limits of law enforcement activities in this context will be informed 
by legal provisions, constitutional jurisprudence, and practical 
considerations. Whether Border Patrol may collaborate with state or 
local law enforcement using methods that violate state—but not 
federal—constitutional rights is an increasingly relevant question, as is 
whether Border Patrol may deliver evidence to the state in the absence 
of collaboration. Several state courts have refused to accept this 
evidence, concluding that such cooperation is not legally permissible, 
while others have gone further by holding that any evidence obtained 
by federal agencies in violation of state constitutional rights will be 
excluded from state courts. As this Article will demonstrate, the 
arguments for rejecting such evidence are convincing. 
I. THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE 
Until nearly the middle of the 20th Century, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence applied only to the federal government and not to the 
states.6 In practice, this meant that while state law enforcement could 
take action that violated both the letter of the Amendment and federal 
court interpretations of it, federal law enforcement action was bound by 
both. However, this divergence led to an important question: what 
would happen if state law enforcement acted in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, but then handed the resulting evidence over to federal 
officers to use in federal prosecutions, where the evidence would have 
otherwise been inadmissible if federal agents had procured it? The 
federal government did put forth such stat-gathered evidence, and the 
federal courts continuously admitted it.7 
In 1949 the Supreme Court officially endorsed the “silver platter 
doctrine” in Lustig v. United States.8 The doctrine was so named 
because state officials were said to hand over evidence to federal 
authorities on a figurative silver platter, allowing federal law 
enforcement to use the evidence that was obtained by states in a 
 
6 In Wolf v. Colorado the Supreme Court expressly held that the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution was “enforceable against the States through the Due 
Process Clause.” 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
7 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388 (1914). 
8 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949). 
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federally unconstitutional manner.9 So long as the federal authorities 
had no hand in securing the evidence, they could use it as they wished. 
For the next decade, the silver platter doctrine was applied by federal 
courts to circumvent the Fourth Amendment, as it did not yet apply to 
state actors. The doctrine’s official acceptance, however, was short-
lived. Eleven years later, the Court overturned the silver platter doctrine 
in Elkins v. United States, holding that evidence that would have been 
inadmissible had the search been conducted by federal officials is also 
inadmissible when provided by state officers for use in a federal trial.10 
Such a practice, the Court decided, violates the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.11 
Just a year later, the question became partially moot. The 
exclusionary rule has applied to the federal government since 1914.12 
The rule dictated that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth 
Amendment protections was not admissible in court, under the theory 
that the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures would be 
meaningless if the evidence obtained illegally were nevertheless 
admissible.13 However, the exclusionary rule applied only to the federal 
government; state law enforcement operated under no such restrictions. 
While the Court determined that Fourth Amendment protections also 
apply to state actions in Wolf v. Colorado, it declined to acknowledge 
the exclusionary rule as essential to safeguard the rights guaranteed 
under the Amendment.14 That finally changed in 1961 with Mapp v. 
Ohio, where the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the 
states.15 Consequently, both the federal government and the states 
operated under identical Fourth Amendment restrictions and remedies 
after 1961; any evidence illegally obtained by a state would be 
inadmissible in either court system. Thus, the silver platter doctrine 
became partially irrelevant because there could be no circumstance 
under which law enforcement actions would violate the Fourth 
 
9 Id. 
10 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208, 223 (1960). 
11 Id. at 223. 
12 E.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
13 Id. at 393. 
14 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28, 33 (1949). 
15 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). 
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Amendment yet remain permissible by state actors. Evidence obtained 
from an illegal search would be inadmissible in either court system.16 
II. REVERSE SILVER PLATTER 
The “reverse silver platter” is the analogue of the silver platter issue 
but working in the opposite direction. It involves a situation wherein 
federal law enforcement acts in a way that is consistent with federal 
constitutional requirements but violates state constitutional protections. 
 
16 While a full examination of it is outside of the scope of this Article, a different 
kind of silver platter case persists. Occasionally there are cases where evidence 
obtained by state actors in violation of state law, but consistent with federal law, 
is then provided to federal authorities for prosecution. Federal courts have held 
that evidence gathered in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal 
court, even if obtained by state authorities under a state warrant in violation of 
state law. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (holding 
that evidence obtained by state actors in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
would be inadmissible in federal court); United States v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d 
765, 770–71 (1st Cir. 1991) (while a federal court may choose to exercise its 
discretion in excluding ill-gotten evidence the general rule is that evidence 
gathered in compliance with the Fourth Amendment will be admissible in a 
federal proceeding); United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1485 n.7 (1st Cir. 
1989) (“Federal law governs the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal 
trials, even when it is obtained pursuant to a state search warrant or in the course 
of a state investigation.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Sheehan, 406 F. 
Supp. 3d 178, 180 (D. Mass. 2019) (“evidence gathered under a state warrant is 
admitted in federal proceedings if the warrant substantially complies with federal 
law”). In other words, patent illegality in the gathering of the evidence would not 
necessarily require exclusion of the evidence in federal court. Even a state court 
order to suppress the same evidence in state court based on state law (or the state 
court’s interpretation of federal law) would not render the evidence inadmissible 
in federal court. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008); United 
States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2000). Interestingly, the reverse 
scenario leads to the opposite result: a federal agent who obtained evidence 
illegally under federal law was enjoined from testifying in a state court 
prosecution concerning the illegally obtained evidence. Rea v. United States, 350 
U.S. 214, 217 (1956). This doctrine is controversial. It arguably incentivizes state 
and local law enforcement to ignore the protections states provide their citizens 
and federal law enforcement to encourage these state actors to do so. This 
potentially abrogates the very protections that state legislatures intended to 
provide and allows for the circumvention of otherwise applicable protections. The 
issue could be framed in this way: as a requirement for evidence to be admissible 
in their courts, federal courts require it be obtained consistent with federal law, 
regardless of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it was obtained. States can, and 
should, do the same by holding that to be admissible in state courts, evidence must 
have been obtained consistent with state law. 
238 UMass Law Review v. 16 | 232 
State officials—in a state prosecution—would then proffer evidence 
they received on a “silver platter” from federal officials, which would 
have been inadmissible had it been obtained by state officials due to the 
violation of state constitutional provisions. A “reverse silver platter 
doctrine” would hold that the gathering of evidence by federal actors 
that was illegal under the state constitution would not require the 
evidence to be excluded in the state trial. 
While the reverse silver platter issue is relevant to a number of 
federal agencies, it is particularly salient with Border Patrol. Courts 
have construed the Fourth Amendment to allow the Border Patrol to 
operate under reduced restrictions, which permit the agency to conduct 
searches without a warrant and with little suspicion of wrongdoing 
under circumstances which other federal agencies may not.17 The 
justification for such allowance is to permit the agency to carry out its 
important charge of immigration and customs enforcement at the 
border.18 Yet Border Patrol operations do not take place exclusively at 
the border—they actually extend far inside the U.S. and have become 
increasingly expansive in recent years.19 Given the reduced 
constitutional protections and a lower required standard of suspicion, 
searches conducted by Border Patrol agents frequently yield evidence 
of crimes unrelated to immigration violations. This evidence often 
would not have been obtained had ordinary search and seizure standards 
 
17 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973). The 
constitutional leeway given to Border Patrol is controversial. See, e.g., id. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that exceptions to the warrant 
requirement apply to Border Patrol operations. See id. at 274–75 (quoting Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)). 
18 Id. at 272. 
19 Daniel E. Martínez et al., Border Enforcement Developments Since 1993 and How 
to Change CPB, CTR FOR MIGRATION STUD. N.Y. (Aug. 24, 2020), 
http://doi.org/10.14240/cmsesy082420 [https://perma.cc/Y2MD-NFY6] (From 
1992 the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents “has swelled more than five-fold, 
peaking at 21,444 in 2011 before leveling off to 19,648 by 2019 . . . [and b]y 2019, 
its budget had ballooned to nearly $4.7 billion, increasing year-over-year since 
the beginning of the Trump administration.”); Border Patrol Overview, U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-
us-borders/overview [https://perma.cc/K26U-D34D] (“An increase in smuggling 
activities has pushed the Border Patrol to the front line of the U.S. war on drugs. 
Our role as the primary drug-interdicting organization along the Southwest border 
continues to expand.”). 
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applied, but it is frequently handed over for use in prosecution by state 
courts. Furthermore, Border Patrol has a lengthy and troubled history of 
violating even the more circumscribed constitutional rights it is meant 
to operate under, raising additional concerns about the use of such 
evidence in state proceedings. This is corroborated by the fact that many 
of the reverse silver platter legal challenges involve Border Patrol. Apart 
from the Border Patrol, the constitutional analysis below also includes 
relevant cases from other federal agencies. 
A. State Privacy Rights Provisions 
Under what circumstances might a federal action violate a state 
constitution? It is a longstanding principle of constitutional law that the 
rights provided in the U.S. Constitution provide a minimum level of 
protection beneath which state actors may not venture. That is to say, 
states are free to go beyond the civil liberties laid out in the federal 
Constitution and provide additional protections to their own citizens. 
Likewise, when a state constitutional provision is similar or identical to 
a federal one, state courts are not obligated to interpret the meaning of 
their state provisions in the same manner as the U.S. Supreme Court. 
For example, the high court has held that even in the face of an illegal 
search and seizure, the illegally obtained evidence will still be 
admissible—and the exclusionary rule will not apply—if the officer had 
a reasonable, good faith belief that they were acting legally at the time.20 
However, Connecticut,21 New Jersey,22 New Mexico,23 North 
Carolina,24 and Pennsylvania25 do not recognize this “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule. In those states, any evidence 
 
20 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (when a search is unlawful 
due to police negligence in procuring the warrant, that negligence alone does not 
require the exclusion of the evidence procured by the search); Arizona v. Evans, 
514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (evidence ruled admissible when officers reasonably 
relied on invalid warrant due to clerical error of court employee); United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (evidence admissible when obtained in 
reasonable reliance on an invalidated warrant). 
21 See State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1324 (Conn. 1993) (in the context of the 
automobile exception in Connecticut). 
22 See State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856–57 (N.J. 1987). 
23 See State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1993). 
24 See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988). 
25 See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 891–92 (Pa. 1991). 
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obtained illegally will be inadmissible in a state case regardless of 
whether the officer acted in “good faith.”26 
When faced with a question of interpreting a state constitutional 
provision that is analogous to the Fourth Amendment, states typically 
take one of several approaches. One approach is known as “lockstep,” 
whereby a state court interprets a state constitutional provision in 
“lockstep” with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the analogous 
federal provision.27 With new Court decisions the federal interpretation 
of provisions change, and state courts apply those new interpretations to 
their own analogous provisions. A similar approach might be called 
“lockstep-lite,” meaning the state court reserves the right to interpret 
analogous provisions differently, but in practice does so rarely or not at 
all.28 Alternatively, a state may take a “primacy” approach, and resolve 
questions of civil liberties by relying on state provisions and the state 
courts’ independent interpretations thereof; Supreme Court 
jurisprudence may or may not be considered presumptively 
persuasive.29 The result, therefore, is that the full scope of any individual 
citizen’s civil liberties depends upon which state they are in. 
Given the practical implications involved, it is worth exploring how 
many states provide greater search and seizure protections than the 
federal government. A thorough analysis undertaken in 2007 found that 
at least 28 states have provided heightened protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures than what exist at the federal level.30 
Since that survey, additional developments have taken place: Iowa, for 
example, abandoned its lockstep approach in 201031 by issuing several 
holdings that expanded the scope of search and seizure protections 
 
26 In other states, and in federal court, the same evidence obtained under the same 
facts would be admissible. See cases cited supra note 20. 
27 Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. L.J. 417, 
418, 426 (2007). 
28 See, e.g., id. at 418. 
29 Eric M. Hartmann, Note, Preservation, Primacy, and Process: A More Consistent 
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation in Iowa, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2265, 
2272–73 (2017). 
30 See Gorman, supra note 27. 
31 Stave v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (holding that “while United 
States Supreme Court cases are entitled to respectful consideration, we will 
engage in independent analysis of the content of our state search and seizure 
provisions”). 
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beyond Supreme Court decisions.32 In 2014, Missouri voters approved 
a state constitutional amendment explicitly protecting electronic 
communications and data from unreasonable search and seizure, 
making it the first state in the nation to do so.33 
Searches of motorists and their vehicles are the most common type 
of Border Patrol search.34 Of the states that are not in “lockstep” and 
have vested citizens with increased privacy protections, several 
provisions are directly applicable to searches of motorists. Idaho,35 
Michigan,36 Minnesota,37 Oregon,38 Rhode Island,39 and Washington40 
prohibit sobriety checkpoints under state constitutional provisions. 
 
32 See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 798–99 (Iowa 2018) (holding that 
warrantless inventory search of impounded car violates state constitution); State 
v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Iowa 2017) (holding that a traffic “stop must 
end when reasonable suspicion is no longer present” and a further search 
contravenes state constitutional protections); State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 3 
(Iowa 2015). 
33 MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. The new language reads 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, 
effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize 
any person or thing, or access electronic data or communication, 
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person 
or thing to be seized, or the data or communication to be accessed, 
as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by 
written oath or affirmation. 
 Id. 
34 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) (discussing how 
most illegal entrants “leave the border area in private vehicles”). 
35 State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063 (Idaho 1988) (holding that police 
roadblocks are unconstitutional under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
36 Sitz v. Dept. of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993) (holding that 
police “sobriety checklanes violate art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution”). 
37 Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183,183–84 (Minn. 1994) (holding 
that temporary police “roadblocks violate Minn. Const. art. I, § 10”). 
38 Nelson v. Lane Cty., 743 P.2d 692, 694 (Or. 1987) (affirming the holding of the 
appeals court that sobriety checkpoints are unreasonable per Article I, section 9 
of the Oregon Constitution). 
39 Pimental v. Dep’t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1352–3 (R.I. 1989) (“police 
roadblocks for drunk driving are so violative of our citizen’s rights that they must 
be declared unconstitutional” under article I, section 6 of the Rhode Island 
Constitution). 
40 City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“sobriety 
checkpoint program therefore violated petitioners’ rights under article 1, section 
7” of the Washington Constitution). 
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Statutes in Iowa, Montana, and Wyoming41 list permissible purposes of 
law enforcement checkpoints, and sobriety checks are not included. The 
U.S. Supreme Court held these checkpoints to be constitutional in 
1990.42 Despite this holding, Texas courts have held sobriety 
checkpoints to be illegal under the federal Fourth Amendment, “unless 
and until a politically accountable [state] governing body sees fit to 
enact constitutional guidelines” for their operation.43 A different kind of 
vehicle search, using drug detection dogs, is prohibited in New 
Hampshire without an articulable reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
involving controlled substances,44 which again, exceeds federal 
requirements.45 Colorado prohibits the warrantless, suspicion-less use 
of drug detection dogs if the dog is trained to detect marijuana.46 
Minnesota requires a heightened level of “individualized articulable 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an 
investigative stop.”47 Nevada also sets a higher standard than what is 
federally required before a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest 
is permissible.48 Finally, Iowa has additional restrictions on the legality 
of vehicle searches.49 
The fact that these states and others provide more extensive privacy 
rights than those provided federally creates the potential for federal law 
 
41 See IOWA CODE § 321K.1 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-502 (2021); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-17-102 (2020). Other states while not explicitly referencing 
sobriety checkpoints do prohibit vehicle stops unless police officers have probable 
cause thereby excluding sobriety roadblocks. See e.g., WIS. STAT. § 349.02 
(2020). 
42 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
43 Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). 
44 State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990) (canine search satisfies state 
constitutional requirements when it is, among other requirements, “based on a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the property searched contains controlled 
substances”). 
45 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005) (warrantless and suspicion-less 
drug dog sniffs are constitutional under federal law). 
46 People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 7. 
47 Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994). 
48 Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 374 (Nev. 2003) (“We now conclude that, under 
the Nevada Constitution, there must exist both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances for police to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile incident 
to a lawful custodial arrest.”). 
49 See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 3, 12–13 (Iowa 2015) (holding that the 
warrantless search of a safe in defendant’s vehicle after his arrest violated the state 
constitution). 
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enforcement to act in ways that run afoul of state constitutional rights. 
Federal officials are ordinarily bound only by federal Fourth 
Amendment provisions. This means that state protections that are 
analogous to the Fourth Amendment are not applicable to federal 
officials acting on behalf of the federal government within the 
geographic boundaries of any given state. Yet, what happens when 
federal officials move to deliver evidence to state law enforcement for 
state prosecution, when that evidence would be inadmissible had it been 
obtained by those same state actors? 
This question introduces the general “reverse silver platter” 
dilemma: federal law enforcement obtains evidence legally under the 
U.S. Constitution and hands it to a state for use in a prosecution where 
state officials would ordinarily have been prohibited from obtaining and 
using that same evidence. In the context of Border Patrol activity, such 
a scenario is especially likely when states like Nevada50 and New 
Hampshire51 provide additional privacy protections to motorists and 
their vehicles. Reverse silver platter issues also arise when Border Patrol 
conducts a search without a warrant, or without the level of suspicion 
that would have otherwise been required under either the Fourth 
Amendment or the state’s Fourth Amendment analogue. 
B. State Cases Adopting Reverse Silver Platter 
Of the states that have been faced with the reverse silver platter 
question, several have adopted the doctrine, and will admit evidence in 
a state court prosecution which would have been excluded had it been 
obtained by state actors. In a 1973 Maine case, Customs officers turned 
over evidence to state police, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
held that there was no constitutional violation in doing so.52 The court 
stated that it did not “perceive any policy . . . which would lead us to 
forbid this cooperation between federal and state officials.”53 
Florida has also admitted reverse silver platter evidence. In Morales 
v. State, border officials searched the defendants’ sea-going vessel 
without a warrant and discovered marijuana.54 Federal officials declined 
to prosecute and instead provided the evidence to local police for state 
 
50 Camacho, 75 P.3d at 374. 
51 State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990). 
52 State v. Allard, 313 A.2d 439, 451 (Me. 1973). 
53 Id. 
54 Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
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prosecution.55 The Florida Court of Appeals held that because the 
evidence was obtained in compliance with federal law, it was admissible 
in either a federal or state court.56 However, the court did not provide an 
analysis or a rationale for its holding on this issue.57 In another case 
involving Border Patrol, Vermont endorsed the reverse silver platter 
doctrine when it held that evidence seized by Border Patrol agents at a 
checkpoint 97 miles from the border could not be challenged by 
reference to search and seizure provisions of the state constitution.58 The 
evidence was therefore admissible in state court.59 
C. State Cases Adopting Conditional Reverse Silver Platter 
A number of states have declined to accept a categorical reverse 
silver platter doctrine and instead have adopted a conditional one. These 
states have held that the doctrine will apply only if certain conditions 
are met. Those conditions typically involve the extent to which state 
actors were involved in the search that produced the evidence in 
violation of the state constitution.60 If state actors were involved in the 
search to a certain threshold degree, or if state and federal actors were 
working so closely together that the federal actors might be viewed as 
state agents, then state constitutional law applies to determine the 
admissibility of evidence. Unfortunately, the level of involvement that 
will trigger inadmissibility of the evidence varies and at times is unclear. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, took such a 
position in 1989 when it admitted evidence seized by federal officials 
that would have violated state constitutional provisions.61 In that case, 
 
55 Id. at 329. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 State v. Rennis, 2014 VT 8, ¶ 2, ¶ 16, 195 Vt. 492, 90 A.3d 906. 
59 See id. at ¶ 11 (citing State v. Dreibelbis, 511 A.2d 307, 308 (Vt. 1986) (“stating 
that so long as evidence seized by federal customs officials during routine customs 
inspection meets federal standards for such searches, that evidence is admissible 
in state prosecution”)). In Rennis the Supreme Court of Vermont used the 
reasoning of the Dreibelbis Court to uphold the trial court’s denial of Rennis’ 
motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 15. 
60 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Mass. 1981); State v. 
Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1326 (N.J. 1989); Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 754–55 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1994); State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (absent 
involvement by state actors, the state constitution did not require the exclusion of 
evidence obtained entirely through the efforts of federal actors). 
61 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1318. 
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federal officers seized the defendant’s hotel telephone records without 
a warrant.62 The court nevertheless admitted the evidence, holding that 
when “federal officers act[] independently of state authorities and in 
conformity with federal law,” the evidence is admissible despite state 
law.63 Activities such as “antecedent mutual planning, joint operations, 
cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance between” agencies may 
eliminate the necessary independence, but “mere contact, awareness of 
ongoing investigations, or the exchange of information may not[.]”64 
Further, in determining whether a threshold agency relationship was 
present, the New Jersey court in State v. Minter looked, in part, to the 
purpose of the search: “If a purpose of the investigation is for a State 
prosecution, the federal agents can, in effect, be deemed agents of the 
State[.]”65 
The New Jersey Appellate Court applied this agency standard in a 
subsequent case involving the admissibility of a statement to a federal 
officer in a state murder prosecution.66 In applying the “vital, significant 
condition”67 that the federal agents must have “acted independently and 
without cooperation or assistance of our own state officers,”68 the court 
addressed whether the federal action could be considered state action to 
“any legally significant degree.”69 Because this case involved a “joint, 
cooperative effort” between federal and state agencies to investigate the 
murder charge, the court found state constitutional protections applied, 
and the evidence was excluded.70 
Texas appears to have initially taken a similarly skeptical view of 
the reverse silver platter doctrine, noting that “[t]he use by state officials 
of evidence obtained through a search that did not comport with state 
constitutional protections would be problematic,” particularly in the 
event of “[s]tate participation in the federal search.”71 Such a scenario 
may prevent the admissibility of the evidence in Texas courts, and may 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1318, 1328–29. 
64 Id. at 1329. 
65 State v. Minter, 561 A.2d 570, 577 (N.J. 1989). 
66 State v. Knight, 661 A.2d 298, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
67 Id. at 307 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329). 
68 Id. at 308 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1330). 
69 Id. at 307 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329). 
70 Id. at 309. 
71 Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
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also invalidate a state search warrant obtained on the basis of that 
evidence.72 
In Pena v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals again addressed a fact 
scenario raising similar questions.73 There, Border Patrol was 
participating in a joint operation with the Texas Department of Public 
Safety (“DPS”) at an international bridge in Brownsville.74 While 
Customs agents were looking for individuals illegally transporting 
weapons, ammunition, or excessive currency across the border into 
Mexico, the DPS was searching for stolen vehicles and vehicles with 
altered VIN plates.75 Both federal and state agents involved in the 
operation questioned and detained suspects.76 The court held that 
“[e]vidence that is obtained by federal agents acting lawfully and in 
conformity with federal authority is admissible in state proceedings,”77 
thereby recognizing the reverse silver platter doctrine. The court 
qualified this holding by noting that the question turned on the nature of 
the relationship and agency between federal and state officers.78 In other 
words, if Customs agents are, in effect, acting as agents for the state 
police and doing so under color of state law, then “the border search 
exception ‘may not be used to circumvent the constitutional requirement 
of probable cause placed on police officers.’”79 Consistent with other 
conditional reverse silver platter jurisdictions, the court determined that 
“[e]vidence of antecedent mutual planning, joint operations, 
cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance”80 were central to the 
inquiry, all of which suggest an agency relationship. Awareness of 
investigations or communication between the agencies alone would not 
be enough.81 
 
72 Id. In this case, the evidence was admissible because the search complied with the 
terms of both the Fourth Amendment and the Texas Constitution. Id. at 192. The 
admissibility of the federally-obtained evidence in state court was thus not an 
endorsement of reverse silver platter; indeed, the court’s discussion of that issue 
offers a rejection of it. Id. at 190. 
73 Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 750–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
74 Id. at 750. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 751. 
77 Id. at 754 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). 
78 Id. (citing State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1326–27 (N.J. 1989)). 
79 Id. at 755 (quoting People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 863, 865–66 (N.Y. 1975)). 
80 Id. (quoting State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). 
81 Id. 
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The court appears to then relax this standard, pronouncing that 
“[n]ot every joint operation” would trigger an agency relationship.82 In 
fact, the operation in this case did not, because “there is no reason that 
the limited forces of the Customs Service cannot enlist the aid of other 
law enforcement entities in forming task forces to meet their needs.”83 
This no reason why not approach was further clarified by a standard that 
in order for evidence to be admissible in state court in violation of state 
law, the search conducted during a federal-state collaboration merely 
had to be conducted “under the aegis of and in cooperation with 
Customs agents.”84 This applies even where the two agencies were 
operating with distinct purposes, as they were in this case.85 However, 
the “under the aegis of and in cooperation with Customs agents” 
standard is not only vague, but appears to be exceptionally weak, as 
nearly every joint operation would likely fit this criterion. Under this 
standard, even with significant involvement by state actors, if federal 
agents are involved at all, federal rules will apply. The result is that 
nearly every joint operation between federal agents and state officers 
would only be subject to federal law. Federal gathering of evidence is 
in fact the entire premise of reverse silver platter; it cannot also function 
as a standard by which to conditionally accept it. Doing so amounts to 
an elimination of any agency criterion whatsoever. 
The Pena Court’s standard is all the more problematic when one 
considers that Texas law enforcement is constitutionally prohibited 
from conducting checkpoint stops to locate stolen cars under both 
federal and state law.86 The cooperative efforts between Texas law 
enforcement officers and Border Patrol enabled the Texas officers to 
utilize prohibited “general crime control” checkpoints under the guise 
of Border Patrol’s border search exception. The same checkpoints, if 
conducted without Border Patrol agents, would be explicitly prohibited 
by both state and federal law.87 The standard laid out by the Texas court 
is fundamentally at odds with that same court’s acknowledgement that 
“[t]he ‘core evil’ to be prevented is the ‘misconduct of local law 
enforcement agents in using Federal Customs agents to conduct a local 
 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (citing United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
84 Id. (quoting Alfonso, 759 F.2d at 735). 
85 Id. at 756 (citing United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
86 Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
87 See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
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investigation by unlawful means.’”88 Determining that a federal-state 
operation was conducted under federal auspices and with their 
cooperation does nothing to address this risk of illegal state conduct. 
Unsurprisingly, the court determined that the facts of this case did not 
rise to the level of impermissible agency and admitted the evidence.89 
Massachusetts also appears to employ a conditional reverse silver 
platter doctrine. In Commonwealth v. Jarabek, the Supreme Judicial 
Court addressed the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s 
conversations that had been recorded in violation of state law pursuant 
to a joint state-federal operation.90 The court held that even in the face 
of “heavy Federal presence,” where the recordings in question were 
made by federal agents and pursuant to federal law, a combined state-
federal operation necessitates the application of state privacy 
protections provided by Massachusetts statute.91 More than a decade 
later, the same court admitted evidence where the investigation was 
“essentially” federal in nature, with “minimal” assistance provided by 
state actors.92 However, apparently acknowledging the broad potential 
implications of the holding, the court stated that “[n]othing in this 
opinion should be read as endorsing a ‘reverse silver platter’ doctrine.”93 
Given that the court was in fact accepting reverse silver platter evidence, 
it is unclear how it understood the doctrine it was refusing to endorse. 
The primary issue for the court in both cases appears to turn on the 
degree of state versus federal participation in the operation in question, 
though there is a distinct lack of clarity in identifying the threshold 
degree of prohibited participation. 
The Washington Supreme Court endorsed a conditional reverse 
silver platter doctrine in 1986 when it held that evidence obtained in a 
manner that would have violated state law was nevertheless admissible 
if it was obtained by federal officials according to federal standards.94 
 
88 Pena, 61 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting People v. Desnoyers, 705 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 
(2000)). 
89 Id. at 758. 
90 Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Mass. 1981). 
91 Id. at 493. 
92 Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455, 457–58 (Mass. 1997). The court 
declined to hold that “the slightest level of assistance from local law enforcement” 
to federal agents triggered state protections. Id. at 457. 
93 Id. at 457. 
94 State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). Oddly, the case did 
not mention a state Supreme Court decision from six years prior coming to the 
opposite conclusion: that the state privacy act applied to evidence used in state 
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In Washington, the conditional reverse silver platter doctrine only 
applies when: (1) the evidence was lawfully obtained in the alternate 
jurisdiction; and (2) the state actors did not “act as agents or cooperate 
with . . . the foreign jurisdiction.” 95 This appears to be a broad 
exclusion that is not dependent upon the degree of cooperation, but 
whether any existed at all. In the absence of such cooperation, the 
federally obtained evidence would be accepted in state courts.96 
D. State Cases Rejecting Reverse Silver Platter 
New York state has taken a critical view of the reverse silver platter 
doctrine. In several cases involving Border Patrol searches, its courts 
 
court, even when it was obtained by federal agents consistent with federal law, 
rendering the evidence inadmissible in state court. See State v. Williams, 617 P.2d 
1012, 1018 (Wash. 1980) (en banc). 
95 State v. Vance, 444 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). See also State v. 
Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 577 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (“[A]ntecedent mutual 
planning, joint operations, cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance 
between federal and state officers may sufficiently establish agency and serve to 
bring the conduct of the federal agents under the color of state law.” (quoting State 
v. Gwinner, 796 P.2d 728, 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)); In re Teddington, 808 
P.2d 156, 163 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (“searches conducted by federal officers 
pursuant to federal law are admissible in Washington courts notwithstanding the 
dictates of our state constitution”); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 988–89 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1994) (“evidence that is lawfully obtained by federal officers” admissible 
in state court even if state constitution would have required its exclusion, provided 
that federal officers acted without the cooperation or assistance of state officers); 
Gwinner, 796 P.2d at 731–32 (evidence obtained by “federal officers who were 
not acting in cooperation with or at the request of state officers[,]” was admissible 
in state criminal trial). 
96 A number of other Washington decisions have endorsed a reverse silver platter 
with respect to federal actions. See, e.g., State v. Mezquia, 118 P.3d 378, 385–86 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (lawfully obtained evidence of defendant’s DNA test 
results from a cheek swab conducted in Florida deemed admissible in state murder 
trial even though the evidence, if obtained in Washington, would violate 
Washington law). Tennessee and Alaska have taken a similar approach to that of 
the Washington courts. See State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tenn. 1993) 
(Tennessee constitutional provisions applied where a Kentucky search warrant 
was obtained at the request of Tennessee authorities pursuant to a state agent’s 
affidavit); State v. Hudson, 849 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. 1993) (if federal agents 
act “wholly independently” from state agents, federal law governs; when federal 
agents act in cooperation with state officers, state law applies); See also Pooley v. 
State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“[T]he Alaska Constitution 
was not implicated” when evidence was seized in Alaska by agents acting 
pursuant to a warrant lawfully issued in California as there was no evidence of an 
ongoing joint effort between the two jurisdictions). 
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have excluded evidence obtained by federal agents which was 
subsequently provided to the state for prosecution. In People v. LePera, 
a Customs inspector conducted a search of the defendant, and seized 
gambling records which were later provided to state prosecutors.97 The 
court held that, even when the legality of the initial stop and search 
under federal law is unquestioned, the evidence was not admissible in 
state court.98 The search was conducted pursuant to the border search 
exception.99 The limited purpose for the border search exception, the 
court noted, was to “effectively enforce the Customs laws.”100 Actions 
that are permitted under this exception would be unreasonable and 
prohibited if undertaken for other purposes. The court emphasized that 
the “special limited powers” of border officials did not include general 
law enforcement or criminal investigation.101 Therefore, the federal 
official in LePera “exceeded his authority” by seizing the defendant’s 
gambling records on behalf of local law enforcement because the 
records were only relevant to state criminal law.102 In excluding the 
evidence, the court noted that the border search exception “may not be 
used to circumvent the constitutional requirement of probable cause 
placed upon police officers.”103 It is noteworthy that the court drew this 
conclusion even in the absence of any local police involvement or 
wrongdoing at the time of the search and seizure. 
Similarly, an earlier New York trial court held that evidence of a 
stolen credit card seized by a border agent in the course of a border 
search was inadmissible in a state prosecution.104 The court noted that 
“the purpose of the [customs] statute was to prevent smuggling of aliens, 
contraband, or merchandise subject to duty.”105 “Since a credit card is 
not contraband or merchandise subject to duty,” it would not be within 
 
97 People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395–96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
98 Id. at 398. 
99 Id. at 396. The border search exception permits warrantless searches without 
probable cause in circumstances in which they would not otherwise apply, i.e., 
away from the border or if performed by other agencies. Id. 
100 Id. at 397. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 398. 
103 Id. (quoting People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 863, 865–66 (N.Y. 1975)). 
104 People v. Regnet, 443 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645, 647 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (granting 
defendant’s motion to suppress the credit card evidence). 
105 Id. at 645. 
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the proper jurisdiction of customs agents,106 thus rendering the search 
improper and inadmissible in the state’s prosecution. A few years later 
the scope of the issue was presented even more expansively. In People 
v. Griminger, the state’s highest court rejected the prosecution’s 
argument that only federal law should apply to the admissibility of 
evidence in state court where a federal warrant was “executed by 
Federal agents.”107 The court stated, “[s]ince defendant has been tried 
for crimes defined by the State’s Penal Law, we can discern no reason 
why he should not also be afforded the benefit of our State’s search and 
seizure protections.”108 However, a trial court in that state later held 
when the subject of the search was properly within Customs’ purview 
(i.e., there is a “significant Federal interest” in the subject of the search, 
such as the international “transport of hazardous medical materials”), 
then the evidence obtained from it may be used in a state prosecution.109 
The Supreme Court of Oregon likewise rejected the reverse silver 
platter doctrine in 1992 when it decided People v. Davis. Although the 
evidence in question was obtained in another state rather than by the 
federal government, the court held that the emphasis on individual rights 
within the Oregon Constitution necessitated the conclusion that its 
search and seizure provisions apply to any evidence proffered in state 
court.110 The court reasoned that the holding applied no “matter where 
that evidence was obtained (in-state or out-of-state), or what 
governmental entity (local, state, federal, or out-of-state) obtained it.”111 
The court acknowledged that this holding may mean that evidence will 
be excluded even when out-of-state agents act in good faith.112 The court 
ultimately held this possibility to be peripheral to the central issue: state 
constitutional rights are guaranteed to the individual defendant in state 
courts, and the only way to effectuate those rights is by applying them 
in state trials.113 As a result, the exclusionary rule applies to all evidence 
in Oregon state trials, and it cannot be overcome by reference to where 
or by whom it was obtained.114 The same court affirmed this ruling a 
 
106 Id. 
107 People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 412 (N.Y. 1988). 
108 Id. 
109 People v. Desnoyers, 705 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2000). 
110 State v. Davis, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012–13 (Or. 1992). 
111 Id. at 1012. 
112 Id. at 1013. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1012–13. 
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year later in State v. Rodriguez, where evidence legally obtained by a 
federal agent under federal law was excluded from the state trial because 
it violated Oregon’s constitutional provisions.115 The court “[saw] no 
reason why the factual distinction between a state officer and a federal 
officer has any legal significance in determining whether certain 
evidence is admissible in an Oregon criminal prosecution.”116 The 
holding was reaffirmed by the court once again in 2017.117 
The New Mexico Supreme Court followed Oregon’s lead and dealt 
a solid blow to the reverse silver platter doctrine in 2001 with State v. 
Cardenas-Alvarez.118 The motorist defendant in that case encountered a 
permanent Border Patrol checkpoint.119 After initial questioning, the 
federal agent “ordered the [d]efendant to a secondary inspection area” 
for further questioning and a vehicle search, during which marijuana 
was found.120 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that (1) the agent’s 
actions did not violate the federal constitution; (2) the agent’s actions 
did violate the state constitution; and (3) the evidence must be excluded 
from state court as a result of that violation.121 Similarly, the Indiana 
Supreme Court applied the state constitution when determining whether 
a state prosecutor should be permitted to base a conviction upon 
evidence that was the product of a federal warrant.122 More recently, in 
2011 the Hawaii Supreme Court decided State v. Torres, and overturned 
state precedent from 1996 by holding that evidence obtained in another 
jurisdiction should be subject to admissibility review under Hawaii 
law.123 
A reverse silver platter issue was raised in New Hampshire in a case 
stemming from events that occurred in August and September of 2017. 
Border Patrol set up a temporary checkpoint in the town of Woodstock, 
New Hampshire, approximately 90 miles south of the Canadian 
 
115 State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399, 403 (Or. 1993). 
116 Id. 
117 State v. Keller, 396 P.3d 917, 922 (Or. 2017). 
118 State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001). 
119 Id. at 227. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 228. The court held that prolonging a border stop beyond “questions 
regarding citizenship and immigration status” required reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity under the New Mexico Constitution. Id. at 231. No such 
suspicion existed in this case, rendering the search illegal under state law. Id. 
122 Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 542 (Ind. 1994). 
123 State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1021 (Haw. 2011). 
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border.124 Border Patrol used drug detection “dogs to monitor the 
vehicles passing through the checkpoints[,]” and those that elicited an 
alert from the dog were searched by Border Patrol officers without a 
warrant.125 Local law enforcement was present at these checkpoints, and 
any illegal controlled substances discovered as a result of these searches 
were provided to the local police for prosecution in state court.126 The 
operation resulted in forty-four people being charged “with possession 
of small amounts of controlled substances – mostly marijuana.”127 
The defendants argued that the warrantless searches violated both 
the federal and state constitutions.128 The court appeared to 
acknowledge this divergence in protections with respect to using drug 
detection dogs, surmising that the evidence in question would be 
admissible in federal court before discussing its admissibility in the state 
court.129 
Both the state and Border Patrol agents argued that “the primary 
purpose of the . . . checkpoints was to maintain the integrity of the 
[country’s] international borders.”130 The court was highly skeptical of 
this assertion, noting that the number of arrests for immigration 
violations was significantly less than number of arrests for drug 
possession.131 Furthermore, of the twenty-five immigration-related 
arrests, none had illegally crossed the Canadian border; rather, “most of 
the individuals arrested for immigration violations had entered the 
United States legally but had overstayed visas.”132 The court found that 
 
124 State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, 2018 WL 2106769, at *1 (N.H. 




128 Id. at *2. For purposes of this Article, it will be presumed that the vehicular 
searches were consistent with federal law, but not with state constitutional 
provisions. The legality of Border Patrol actions in this case was also in dispute; 
indeed, the trial court ultimately held that federal constitutional provisions were 
also violated, stating that “the primary purpose of a motor vehicle checkpoint 
cannot be the random detection of criminal activity such as drug detection. As 
such, the checkpoints were unconstitutional under both State and federal law.” Id. 
at *8. 
129 Id. at *3. 
130 Id. at *8. 
131 Id. & n.15. 
132 Id. at *8. 
254 UMass Law Review v. 16 | 232 
the primary purpose of the checkpoints was not immigration-related, but 
drug interdiction.133 
The court determined that evidence uncovered through the use of 
drug dogs without reasonable suspicion is clearly inadmissible under 
state constitutional provisions.134 It then turned to the question of 
whether the admissibility analysis changes by virtue of the fact that the 
evidence was first obtained by federal Border Patrol officers rather than 
state agents.135 This is the essence of the reverse silver platter question. 
The court rejected that doctrine and excluded all of the evidence 
obtained in this fashion, holding that “the inadmissibility of the 
evidence does not change based on the fact that it was seized by federal 
officers and then handed over to the State.”136 
III. ANALYSIS OF REVERSE SILVER PLATTER ARGUMENTS 
A. The Issue of “Control” 
State courts adopting the reverse silver platter doctrine have done so 
by relying on several arguments. First, courts often focus on the issue 
of “control”—in essence, the question is whether state law or courts may 
control the actions of federal officials.137 When framed this way, the 
answer is undisputedly negative. Federal law enforcement officers 
operate independently from the states in which they are located and are 
bound only by federal rules rather than the particular laws of the state in 
which they are acting.138 Accordingly, no state may properly “control” 
the actions of federal agents. 
For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that “the Vermont 
Constitution does not apply to the conduct of federal government 
officials acting under . . . exclusive federal authority.”139 Courts in New 
Jersey, Texas, and Washington also focused on whether the state could 
“control” the actions of federal agents. In State v. Mollica, the New 
 
133 Id. This would render the checkpoint unconstitutional under federal law, too. See 
supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
134 McCarthy, 2018 WL 2106769, at *7. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J. 1989); see also State v. Coburn, 
683 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Vt. 1996). 
138 See Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1330; See also State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744, 748 
(Tex. App. 1992). 
139 Coburn, 683 A.2d at 1347. 
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Jersey court noted that “state constitutions do not control federal 
action”140 in its rationale for accepting the evidence proffered. In State 
v. Toone, the Texas Court of Appeals held that “protections afforded by 
the constitution of a sovereign entity control the actions only of the 
agents of that sovereign entity.”141 As a result, state constitutional 
provisions did not apply to the actions of those federal agents nor, by 
extension, to the evidence resulting therefrom. The Supreme Court of 
Washington also focused on the inability of the state constitution to 
“control federal officers’ conduct” when it held in State v. Bradley that 
the Border Patrol agents’ actions complied with the federal 
requirements, thus rendering the evidence admissible.142 
These courts declined to acknowledge that the defendants’ 
arguments were focused on actions of the state entity, not the federal, in 
their claim that the state’s prosecutorial apparatus should not be 
permitted to use evidence that was obtained illegally according to state 
law. The issue is presented as a question of who may control federal 
agents. This, however, misstates the fundamental question. State law 
cannot dictate federal operations, and the defendants did not argue that 
it should. Rather, the issue is whether state prosecutors may use 
evidence obtained by federal actors in violation of state rules, or should 
state protections require the exclusion of evidence so obtained. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court responded to the “control” 
argument advanced by state prosecutors, who asserted that the state 
constitution “cannot apply to federal agents.”143 In rejecting this 
argument, the court held: 
We find no mandate in the text of [the state constitution], nor in our 
jurisprudence interpreting this clause, to selectively protect New 
Mexico’s inhabitants from intrusions committed by state but not 
federal governmental actors. Nor do we believe such a limitation is 
appropriate . . . . [F]ederal agents exercise jurisdiction over New 
Mexicans and possess the authority to systematically subject our 
inhabitants to searches, seizures and other interferences. A federal 
agent who wields these powers unreasonably commits precisely the 
sort of “unwarranted governmental intrusion” against which the 
New Mexico Constitution ensures.144 
 
140 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327. 
141 Toone, 823 S.W.2d at 748 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 265 U.S. 465, 475 
(1921)). 
142 State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). 
143 State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225, 231–32 (N.M. 2001). 
144 Id. at 232. 
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As for the concern that such a result makes legal federal actions illegal, 
the court noted that federal agents remain able to vigilantly enforce 
federal law.145 The court’s decision does not impact that ability, nor does 
it attempt to constrain what evidence is used in federal court. But 
“[w]hen such vigilance violates the protections guaranteed by our state 
constitution . . . we will not abandon our guard of those protections in 
order to accommodate evidence thereby yielded . . . . [W]e do possess 
the authority—and indeed the duty—to insulate our courts from 
evidence seized in contravention of our state’s constitution.”146 The U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged the solvency of this analysis in Wilson v. 
Schnettler.147 That case involved an injunction prohibiting federal 
narcotics agents from testifying against the defendant in a state criminal 
trial.148 The original search was legal under federal law, but the Court’s 
analysis remains applicable to a case involving an illegal initial 
search.149 In his dissent, Justice Douglas writes “[i]n the state trial the 
issue will not be whether the federal agents have acted within the limits 
of their federal authority, but whether, under the state constitution, the 
search was a reasonable one.”150 This captures the crux of the analysis 
undertaken in reverse silver platter cases. 
B. The Foregone Conclusion: A ‘Legal’ Search Equals 
Admissible Evidence 
It is also commonly argued that if the search was legal in the 
jurisdiction in which it was conducted (including federally), it should be 
admissible in the state court trial. Courts employing this argument state 
it as a foregone conclusion, rarely explaining why such a conclusion is 
warranted. The Tennessee Supreme Court provided some additional 
rationale related to this claim in State v. Cauley.151 In that case, two 
brothers committed a murder in Tennessee and were convicted using 
evidence uncovered pursuant to a valid Kentucky search warrant.152 The 
court noted that there will inevitably be occasions where a state’s law 
enforcement efforts require the assistance of another jurisdiction, 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 233. 
147 Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385 (1961). 
148 Id. at 382. 
149 Id. at 387. 
150 Id. at 391 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
151 State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tenn. 1993). 
152 Id. at 413–414. 
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leading to cooperation between the jurisdictions.153 It is perhaps 
unreasonable to expect the agents of one state to be familiar with another 
state’s particular constitutional provisions, and even if they were, they 
may be uncomfortable with applying standards and procedures that 
deviate from their own.154 The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized 
these concerns but upheld the application of the Tennessee Constitution 
despite them, as they were insufficient to override the fundamental 
rights of state citizens.155 That case involved state-to-state cooperation; 
it is less clear whether those concerns would apply to the same degree 
when considering federal-to-state cooperation. Nearly all the cases 
discussed here involved federal agents acting within the boundaries of 
the state in question, meaning that the state already had jurisdiction over 
the defendant and was free to act on its own volition consistent with 
state constitutional provisions. When the state enlists the assistance of 
the federal government, or vice-versa, it is often a matter of convenience 
or an attempt to circumvent the protections afforded by state law rather 
than as a matter of necessity. Unlike a situation where a Tennessee 
suspect has relocated to Kentucky, a state suspect cannot “relocate” to 
a federal jurisdiction wherein the federal government must be enlisted 
to search and apprehend him. 
C. The Question of Acting in “Good Faith” 
It may also be argued that rejecting reverse silver platter evidence 
punishes law enforcement even when they act in good faith. Although 
it is probable that bad faith does exist in some cases, it is also true that 
in at least some of the cases, both federal and state law enforcement 
acted reasonably and in good faith according to applicable law in 
obtaining the evidence. Why, then, should law enforcement be 
penalized when they did not intentionally do wrong? 
This focus misconstrues the fundamental nature of search and 
seizure provisions. Those provisions are not, at their core, about 
punishing law enforcement for misdeeds—or even about upholding 
rules for law enforcement in general. Rather, they are about the rights 
of the individual to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.156 
As such, it does not matter to the individual who violated that right, or 
by what legal jurisdiction the violation was accomplished, or whether it 
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was done out of good will or ill. What matters is whether a given state 
has determined that a particular right is central to state citizenship. In 
that situation it would be improper for the courts of that state to welcome 
and use evidence obtained in contravention of rights the legislature 
deems sacrosanct. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Elkins, 
To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been 
invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer. It would be a 
curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the United 
States to differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence 
upon so arbitrary a basis. Such a distinction indeed would appear to 
reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the provisions of the 
Constitution.157 
Indeed, the issue in Elkins was that states were operating under fewer 
restrictions, with more ability to violate privacy rights, and then handing 
over evidence to the federal government.158 In rejecting this, the 
Supreme Court was saying that the dual-jurisdiction mechanism cannot 
be used as an end-run around fundamental constitutional protections. 
There is no logical reason why this same principle should not operate 
when the evidence is being transferred from federal to state rather than 
vice versa. 
In New Jersey, the Mollica court asserted that the reverse silver 
platter doctrine is acceptable because “no state official or person acting 
under color of state law has violated the State Constitution” therefore, 
“no citizen’s individual constitutional rights fail of vindication.”159 The 
court is taking an illogically narrow conception of what it looks like 
when individual rights “fail of vindication.” When the court seemingly 
disregards the fact that the state court is endorsing the violation of the 
New Jersey Constitution, the individual’s state constitutional rights 
most certainly do fail of vindication. Surely a given right would be a 
hollow one—and would not be vindicated—if the very state that 
guarantees the right is unwilling to protect it in its own courts. The fact 
that the state’s own agents cannot be blamed (or entirely blamed) for the 
violation does not vitiate the violation. Selectively nullifying state 
 
157 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960). 
158 Id. at 210. 
159 State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 1988). See also People v. Blair, 602 
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protections simply because the evidence was gathered by federal agents 
would impose an arbitrary distinction that “reflect[s] an indefensibly 
selective evaluation of the provisions of the [state] Constitution.”160 
Fundamentally, if a state has determined that certain rights are central 
to state citizenship, then those rights should be protected in state trials. 
D. The Implications of Judicial Integrity 
Another element discussed in reverse silver platter evidence 
arguments is that of judicial integrity. Judicial integrity as a principle is 
meant to “relieve the courts from being compelled to participate in 
illegal conduct.”161 While a few courts that have accepted the reverse 
silver platter doctrine mention judicial integrity, they have rejected its 
salience, primarily by reasoning that if the evidence was obtained by 
federal agents according to federal law, then judicial integrity is not 
implicated in a decision to admit the evidence in state court.162 For 
example, in People v. Blair the California Supreme Court held that 
because there was no illegal conduct in the evidence seizure itself, 
concerns of judicial integrity did not apply to the state’s use of the 
evidence.163 The Mollica court similarly asserted that reverse silver 
platter evidence did not implicate judicial integrity concerns because it 
involves no “misuse or perversion of judicial process.”164 
However, this too is an unduly narrow conception of judicial 
integrity. In taking a broader view, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court has asserted that the purpose of judicial integrity is the 
“dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct.”165 Yet it is difficult 
to argue that the integrity of the judiciary is upheld when courts admit 
evidence gathered in clear violation of state constitutional protections. 
It is inconsistent for a state to demand that citizens obey the law while 
condoning the violation of constitutional rights by state actors. Indeed, 
“[o]ut of regard for its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian 
of liberty the court should not have a hand in such ‘dirty business.’”166 
 
160 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215. 
161 Blair, 602 P.2d at 748. 
162 See, e.g., id.; State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e do not 
believe deterrence or judicial integrity necessarily require a reexamination of the 
search under standards that hypothetically would have prevailed if the search had 
been performed by state authorities.”); Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328. 
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164 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328. 
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Though a court may not be participating in illegal conduct at the outset 
or placing a “judicial imprimatur on lawlessness”167 with respect to the 
initial search, it would be participating in the abrogation of the rights of 
its own citizens, by placing a judicial imprimatur on their violation. The 
Hawaii Supreme Court recognized this in Torres, holding that “if state 
courts admitted evidence in a state prosecution that was obtained in a 
manner that would be unlawful under our constitution, our courts would 
necessarily be placing their imprimatur of approval on evidence that 
would otherwise be deemed illegal, thus compromising the integrity of 
our courts.”168 Therefore, rejecting the reverse silver platter doctrine 
would uphold the judicial integrity of state courts. It would also serve to 
maintain consistent standards informed by the state constitution in all 
criminal cases within those courts. 
E. Deterrence and Disincentivizing Police Misconduct 
The acceptance of the reverse silver platter doctrine directly 
compromises state efforts to guarantee constitutional protections to 
citizens. It creates perverse incentives for federal agents to bypass state 
protections. Because the fruit of that violation can still be used in a state 
criminal trial, state actors also have reason to encourage it. Indeed, 
agents of different jurisdictions will have clear motive to work together 
in order to avoid legal proscriptions placed on the state.169 Those 
incentives were part of the Elkins Court’s rationale in rejecting the silver 
platter doctrine.170 The U.S. Supreme Court noted their obvious 
existence in state-to-federal cases; it would be naïve to assume the same 
incentives do not work in the reverse direction. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court noted this concern in Minter: “Certainly we would not 
permit State investigators to circumvent the law by merely calling the 
federal agents and asking them to tap a phone.”171 Yet accepting reverse 
silver platter evidence invites such misconduct. 
A corollary of the incentives issue is deterrence of police 
misconduct. Several courts have asserted that, since one of the primary 
purposes of the exclusionary rule is to prevent law enforcement from 
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168 State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Haw. 2011). 
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violating individual rights, that purpose is inapplicable in the case of 
reverse silver platter evidence because the initial search was legal in the 
jurisdiction in which it was obtained.172 For if the state did not itself 
obtain the evidence, and the federal officers who conducted the search 
acted legally according to federal law, then there is no deterrence to be 
expected or desired from excluding the evidence. Indeed, the Mollica 
court centered its analysis of the New Jersey Constitution’s protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure entirely around the issue of 
deterrence of police misconduct.173 The court suggested that if state 
police did nothing wrong, and therefore would not be deterred by 
excluding reverse silver platter evidence, then there is no reason to reject 
it.174 The Maine Supreme Court echoed that of New Jersey when it made 
the sweeping assertion that “[t]he turning over of evidence does not 
promote improper conduct by either local police or Customs agents.”175 
This logic frames the issue too narrowly. In the face of incentives 
and rewards for cooperating with, enlisting the help of, or even simply 
welcoming ill-gotten evidence, precisely what might be deterred by a 
rejection of reverse silver platter evidence are cooperative schemes that 
ignore state constitutional rights. Whether law enforcement actions are 
deliberate and premeditated or not, the circumvention of those rights is 
certainly something worth avoiding. Prohibiting this evidence 
encourages law enforcement to operate within the boundaries and 
restrictions laid out within their own jurisdictions and discourages the 
curtailing of individual liberties. 
Advocates of the reverse silver platter doctrine may point out that 
rejecting this evidence will mean that some state criminal cases will be 
precluded from prosecution despite clear evidence of wrongdoing, and 
some criminals may, as a result, go free. This is undoubtedly true. Yet 
without more, it is an exceptionally weak argument in a discussion of 
constitutional rights and civil liberties. Certainly, all law enforcement 
limitations provided by search and seizure protections will preclude 
some criminal cases and will likely result in some criminals going free. 
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But maximum efficiency in apprehending criminals is not the purpose 
of search and seizure protections and should not be a basis for upholding 
or rejecting them. These protections inherently limit the methods by 
which law enforcement may investigate crimes, and this was considered 
an appropriate trade-off in protecting the rights of all citizens.176 
Indiscriminately searching the homes of all citizens would undoubtedly 
lead police to uncovering more criminal actors. It is also true that some 
criminals will escape prosecution if the state is not allowed to use 
evidence gathered by federal officers in violation of state rights. Neither 
of these possibilities operate as sound reasoning for permitting these 
searches. 
F. The Problems with Adopting a Conditional Reverse Silver 
Platter Doctrine 
Adopting the conditional reverse silver platter doctrine is also rife 
with concerns. The standard is vague and difficult to apply. It can be 
construed as applying to advance knowledge, request,177 
participation,178 assistance,179 cooperation,180 mutual planning181 or 
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formal joint operations.182 It could also apply when federal agents are 
acting “under the color of state law,”183 or when their presence is so 
“heavy”184 or involved as to turn the local efforts into “essentially a 
Federal investigation.”185 Some courts have set the standard as whether 
federal action could be considered state action to “any legally significant 
degree,”186 despite the fact that a “legally significant degree” sets both 
a vague and subjective measure. Other courts have even required 
evidence of a deliberate intent to evade the forum state’s provisions in 
order to find an agency relationship.187 For instance, in a case involving 
federal-state cooperation and a wiretap that was patently illegal under 
state law, the Illinois Supreme Court held that in order for the evidence 
to be suppressed, there must be evidence of a “secret agreement; secret 
cooperation [between the federal and state agency] for a fraudulent or 
deceitful purpose.”188 Thus, even in the presence of a cooperative 
enterprise and agency relationship, the suppression of the evidence turns 
on whether the actors had a subjective intent to deceive. Such evidence 
will be exceptionally difficult to secure. 
These standards make it difficult to ascertain—prospectively or 
retrospectively—at what point state participation will tip the scales in 
favor of the application of state law. Such an approach also “ignores the 
existence of more subtle ‘understandings’ among repeat-player 
domestic law enforcement agencies,”189 where clear evidence of 
cooperation may not be available despite the fact that there was a 
cooperative understanding of some sort. This standard also overlooks 
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the opportunity for “strategic manipulation”190 of jurisdictional rules, 
while leaving cases open to inconsistent application and overly-rigid 
interpretation of what conduct amounts to agency. 
Just as the silver platter doctrine subverts the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment, the reverse silver platter doctrine subverts the 
independent protections of state constitutions. States that have 
interpreted their constitutions as providing more protection than the 
Federal Constitution would in many cases instead be reduced to 
applying only the minimum protections of federal law. 
IV. REVERSE SILVER PLATTER AND U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION (“CBP”) 
Unique concerns arise when states use evidence obtained by Border 
Patrol specifically, as opposed to other federal agencies. The Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”191 Probable cause is 
defined as an objectively reasonable belief, based on the circumstances, 
that an immigration violation or crime has likely occurred; it is a higher 
standard to meet than reasonable suspicion.192 In effect, this means that 
before conducting a search of a person or her belongings, law 
enforcement officers must first obtain a warrant from a judge, based on 
probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found. Failing to do so 
runs afoul of the federal Constitution and violates the rights of the 
individual. 
Border Patrol, however, has been jurisprudentially granted 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.193 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the government’s interest in monitoring 
and controlling entrants outweighs the privacy interest of the individual, 
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thus reducing the expectation of privacy at the border.194 As a result, 
routine searches without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable 
suspicion are inherently reasonable and automatically justified in this 
specific context.195 Fourth Amendment rights are therefore significantly 
circumscribed at the border, and CBP is given expansive authority to 
randomly and without suspicion search, seize, and detain individuals 
and property at border crossings.196 As a result, the circumstances under 
which a Border Patrol agent can conduct a warrantless search without 
probable cause are broader than exists for any other law enforcement 
agency. 
Although nothing in the Fourth Amendment or elsewhere in the 
Constitution provides for such a principle, this doctrine has become 
known as the “border search exception” to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment.197 The precise scope of this exception is in 
dispute and continues to be tested considering that Border Patrol now 
engages in searches not only of suitcases and bags, but also electronic 
devices such as cell phones and laptops—sometimes confiscating them 
without cause.198 Agents have also detained entrants for long periods of 
time without any apparent or stated reason,199 even engaging in invasive 
body searches with no legal justification.200 
A federal regulation from 1953 authorizes Border Patrol to extend 
their range of jurisdiction beyond just borders and ports of entry, to 
include everything within “100 air miles from any external 
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boundary.”201 As a result of interpreting “external boundary” to include 
oceans and all other waterways, the entire eastern seaboard is covered, 
along with most of California, the most highly populated areas of 
Oregon and Washington, the entire states of Florida and Michigan, 
many of the northeastern states, and most of the nation’s other large 
cities.202 Such a wide-ranging authority undoubtedly implicates many 
individuals’ rights considering that approximately 200 million people—
over 65% of the U.S. population—live within the “100-mile zone.”203 
In addition to regular operations at the border and ports of entry, CBP 
operates approximately 32 permanent interior border checkpoints 
throughout the country, and another 39 temporary internal or “tactical” 
checkpoints.204 
When a search is conducted at any border or port of entry (including 
international airports), searches are allowed even in the absence of any 
particularized suspicion.205 At Border Patrol’s internal, non-border 
checkpoints, stops and brief questioning may be conducted without 
suspicion,206 and more intrusive “secondary inspections” may be 
conducted with minimal levels of suspicion.207 In practice, this minimal 
standard is rife with abuse. There are many reports of invasive searches 
conducted with no articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, some of which 
are motivated by race or ethnicity alone.208 Unfortunately, victim 
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recourse and agent discipline in the face of misconduct are both virtually 
nonexistent.209 
These checkpoints often result in the arrest of U.S. citizens at 
significantly higher levels than non-citizens.210 In a three-year period, 
just one non-citizen immigration apprehension was reported at a 
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checkpoint 75 miles within the border in the Yuma, Arizona sector.211 
“[N]ine out of 23 Tucson Sector checkpoints reported zero arrests of 
‘deportable subjects’” in 2013,212 while the Yuma sector arrested eight 
times as many citizens as non-citizens that year and eleven times as 
many in 2011.213 Further, those arrests were primarily for drug 
violations and not immigration violations, as all citizens were legally 
present in the country.214 In the same time frame, that checkpoint also 
received multiple civil rights complaints.215 U.S. citizens are often 
subject to search and harassment even when no drugs are present, such 
as in Jane Doe v. El Paso Hospital, where one U.S. citizen was detained 
at a checkpoint—without a warrant—and was patted down, strip 
searched, subjected to a forced and “observed bowel movement, vaginal 
and rectal exams, speculum exam, x-ray, and CT scan.”216 Finding 
nothing, Border Patrol released the woman without charges.217 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the border search exception 
applies only to the narrow purpose of enforcing immigration and 
Customs laws, which entails ensuring that required duties are paid on 
imported goods and that harmful goods and people do not enter the 
country.218 Other potential government interests—including general 
crime control—may not be effectuated through the border search 
exception. Immigration checkpoints are permissible, according to the 
Court, but only insofar as they involve a minimally intrusive “brief 
detention of travelers” with a “routine and limited inquiry into residence 
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enforcement.220 Immigration checkpoints may not be operated as drug 
checkpoints or focused primarily on broader law enforcement aims like 
crime control.221 Such use would be an unconstitutional violation of 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.222 
Individual reports and complaints would suggest that each of these 
premises and conditions are undermined because in practice, Border 
Patrol agents often appear to ignore these limitations in internal non-
border operations. Agents frequently neglect to provide a reason for 
conducting a search. When reasons are offered, they often do not rise to 
the level of probable cause. Reasons such as a skunk smell emitting from 
the vehicle, possession of a backpack, possession of prescription 
medication, or a motorist refusing to consent to a search are among those 
used by agents to initiate a search.223 Border Patrol enforcement 
activities largely appear to be aimed at drug enforcement. Checkpoints 
are much more likely to uncover drug offenses—particularly small 
amounts of marijuana— than immigration ones, and U.S. citizens are 
largely the ones affected.224 The New Hampshire McCarthy case 
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discussed above is one such example. Drug interdiction appeared to be 
the primary focus of that checkpoint; drug dogs were brought in, the 
state police were enlisted in advance with the specific purpose of 
handling drug cases, and plans were made as to how to efficiently 
proceed with the anticipated drug evidence and suspects so that state 
police could pursue prosecution. Afterwards, the local police chief 
lauded the operation, stating that Border Patrol has “a lot more leeway” 
than police do when it comes to constitutional rights, as he would have 
needed reasonable suspicion before conducting the drug searches that 
took place.225 
Indeed, many individuals report being detained, searched, and 
questioned about weapons, drugs, even medical history, without being 
asked about immigration-related issues or residence status at all.226 In a 
forceful dissent in a 1993 Ninth Circuit case, Judge Kozinski noted the 
significance of the fact that “[f]ifty million vehicles a year pass through” 
just two Border Patrol checkpoints in California.227 The sheer amount 
of contraband seized there, combined with the special drug enforcement 
training received by agents,228 provided Judge Kozinski with “reason to 
suspect the agents working these checkpoints are looking for more than 
illegal aliens . . . . [which] turns a legitimate administrative search into 
a massive violation of the Fourth Amendment.”229 As such, evidence 
suggests “that the Constitution is being routinely violated at these 
checkpoints,” as they have been turned “into general law enforcement 
checkpoints” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.230 
There are a number of troubling accounts of Border Patrol abuses, 
including unlawful searches, seizures, and detentions;231 racial 
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profiling;232 detentions without cause, some of which are lengthy;233 use 
of excessive force;234 improper strip searches and sexual assault;235 and 
a consistent lack of oversight and accountability in response to such 
abuses, from the lowest to the highest levels of agency authority.236 
These accounts suggest that Border Patrol agents largely act with 
impunity, and disciplinary action for even the most egregious of abuses 
is virtually nonexistent.237 In the absence of deterrence, there is little 
incentive to operate within either constitutional constraints or agency 
guidelines. 
Yet the border search exception is limited and is intended for a 
specific and narrow purpose: to permit Customs officials to facilitate 
trade, customs, and immigration laws and regulations at the border.238 
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Even if Border Patrol operations rigidly adhered to the existing 
standards and limitations governing their enforcement activities, it does 
not follow that a state court in a criminal prosecution unrelated to 
customs and immigration may constitutionally admit evidence obtained 
pursuant to the limited scope and purpose of the Border Patrol 
exception. To do so would amount to a circumvention of not only state 
constitutional protections, but the Fourth Amendment as well. The 
empirical evidence that Border Patrol routinely violates even the weaker 
constitutional restrictions placed on them makes this concern all the 
more pressing. 
As the New York court held in People v. Esposito, the border search 
exception was granted “for a particular purpose; [and] it may not be used 
to circumvent” ordinary constitutional restrictions placed on law 
enforcement.239 In gathering evidence of general criminal activity, 
Border Patrol becomes an agent of the police, thus triggering “the full 
panoply of constitutional provisions and curative measures.”240 This is 
the case regardless of the federal agent’s intent to act in agency with the 
state. The Border Patrol operates under an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment by virtue of its role in enforcing immigration and customs 
laws. But when they exceed the scope of that role by enforcing other 
laws, and in places other than the border, the reason for their Fourth 
Amendment exception disappears. Using the evidence anyway under 
the rationale that Border Patrol is allowed more constitutional leeway 
seriously undercuts constitutional protections without justification. 
Therefore, the adoption of the reverse silver platter doctrine is especially 
concerning when applied to evidence seized by Border Patrol. Indeed, 
an overwhelming number of the litigated cases stem from that agency’s 
actions.241 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In a strong call for protection of both civil liberties and principles of 
federalism, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan argued that state 
courts should interpret their state constitutions independently, rather 
than in lockstep with the high court’s interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights.242 A basic premise of federalism is to respect the variation of 
specific rights granted by democratically-enacted state constitutions. 
Justice Brennan was critical of the reduction in civil liberties protections 
provided by federal courts.243 He argued that “one of the strengths of 
our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for 
the rights of our citizens.”244 In the face of reduced federal protections, 
state courts should step up with increased constitutional protections of 
their own.245 Indeed, federalism will be “furthered significantly when 
state courts thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the 
struggle to protect the people of our nation from governmental 
intrusions on their freedoms.”246 
Allowing state criminal courts to ignore state constitutional rights 
detracts from state sovereignty and local control and favors the federal 
standard applicable to whatever federal law enforcement agency is 
acting—no matter the nature of the divergence from state-guaranteed 
rights. The narrower and more short-term desire to convict every 
defendant against whom there exists evidence, however obtained, 
should not overcome the importance of state autonomy, the rights and 
liberties granted citizens, or the long-term deference to principles of 
federalism and respect for constitutional rights. 
The reverse silver platter doctrine has been addressed by only a 
handful of states. Within those states, there is a fairly even split between 
those endorsing the doctrine, adopting a conditional version of the 
doctrine, and rejecting it altogether. It is clear that state criminal courts 
retain the authority to decide whether to accept evidence that was 
obtained by federal agents in ways that violate state constitutional 
protections. However, the countervailing interests of vindicating 
individual rights and civil liberties, federalism, judicial integrity, and 
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encouraging proper law enforcement conduct, while discouraging 
improper incentives, all support the conclusion that the reverse silver 
platter doctrine should be rejected by states outright. In the absence of a 
rejection of the doctrine, it is imperative that, at a minimum, states adopt 
a conditional reverse silver platter doctrine. The analysis would focus 
on an agency relationship between federal and state agencies, and would 
prohibit states from collaborating with federal agencies to search 
individuals when the searches would otherwise violate state or federal 
constitutional protections. Law enforcement cannot be allowed to join 
forces in an effort to bypass the restrictions designed to protect the rights 
of the people. As it stands, by simply joining with an agency bound by 
fewer rules, law enforcement can flout the laws that citizens believe are 
protecting them. The risks attendant to this type of operation are even 
greater with respect to Border Patrol. That agency is granted such 
expansive exceptions to Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
requirements that the potential subversion of constitutional rights 
implicates federal as well as state rights. The states maintain a strong 
interest in upholding and safeguarding their respective constitutional 
provisions. By accepting reverse silver platter evidence, states sacrifice 
these principles and the rights of their own citizens in the interest of 
prosecutorial convenience and increased convictions. That is too high a 
price to pay. 
